



Department of State

TELEGRAM

22

SD02

32  
85964~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

f62

PAGE 01 NEW DE 08848 01 OF 02 231539Z

ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, NEA 13, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,  
 P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAM 03, IO 13, CIA 04, AID 28,  
 SAL 01, RSR 01, MM 01, /159 W

P 231058Z JAN 68

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2757

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 407

AMCONSUL BOMBAY 2544

AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1863

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 88

AMEMBASSY LONDON 617

AMCONSUL MADRAS 1588

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 417R1

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 109

AMEMBASSY PARIS 199

AMEMBASSY RANGOON 105

AMEMBASSY SAIGON 488

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 85

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 48

CINCPAC

RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 284

FI/SPL

CA3

NE4

FE2

EAR3

SB

(46)

OCE/EEP

OCE/SRA

OCE/EEY

OCE/CANZ

ONE

HR/OPS

INDICO

BR2

OER2

OSR/RA

DDF/SRS

OSA

OSI/OS

OBTI 2

SAVA 2

D/FBIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 NEW DELHI 8848PAGE 2 RUSBAE 8848/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJ: CAMBODIA

1. FROM OUR READING OF PRESS AND CABLES AND FROM LOCAL  
 CONVERSATIONS, IT IS CLEAR THAT OBJECTIVES OF CAMBODIAN  
 EXERCISE ARE IN JEOPARDY. AMONG FACTORS EVIDENT HERE

SOD3

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## Department of State

## TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NEW DE 08848 01 OF 02 231539Z

ARE FOLLOWING:

A. UNDER PRESSURE FROM MANY QUARTERS GOI, AND PARTICULARLY MEA, IS SPLIT ON COURSE OF ACTION. BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR PHNOM PENH T. N. KAUL SURPRISED US ALL BY HIS AFFIRMATIVE REACTION TO POSITION TAKEN BY SIHANOUK AND SUPPORTED BY US. AFTER MY RETURN FROM PHNOM PENH FOREIGN SECRETARY DAYAL, AS REPORTED NEW DELHI 8735, STATED THAT COMMISSION HAS AUTHORITY BY SIMPLE MAJORITY TO TAKE ACTION REQUESTED BY PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THAT WHILE AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO BRING POLES AND RUSSIANS ALONG, OR AT LEAST LESSEN THEIR OPPOSITION, GOI MUST BE PREPARED TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY IF NECESSARY. NOW T. N. KAUL IS HEDGING

*ICC  
in  
Camb  
Indus*

HIS ORIGINALLY AFFIRMATIVE POSITION AND EVEN DAYAL APPEARS

PAGE 3 RUSBAE 8848/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
TO BE WATERING DOWN HIS SUPPORT.

B. TITO'S ARRIVAL JAN 22 DIRECTLY FROM PHNOM PENH AND KOSYGIN'S ARRIVAL JAN 25 ARE UNPREDICTABLE FACTORS IN THE EQUATION. IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT TITO WILL BE CARRYING AUTHENTIC WORD OF SIHANOUK'S PRESENT COMMITMENT TO COMMUNIQUE. KOSYGIN'S POSITION WILL LARGELY BE SHAPED BY USSR ESTIMATE OF WHETHER IT CAN GAIN BY KEEPING US BOGGED DOWN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA OR WHETHER DANGER OF MAJOR EXPANSION OF WAR REQUIRES A MORE MODERATE ROLE.

C. AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR IS THE PERSISTENT DOUBT, EVEN AMONG NORMALLY STRONG SUPPORTERS OF US, ABOUT GENUINENESS OF OUR POSITION. THESE DOUBTS STEM FROM WASHINGTON STATE-

MENTS TO WHICH WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REFERRED AND NEWS OF RECENT US VIOLATION OF CAMBODIAN BORDER.

*Bundy  
Pleam  
Monta  
village*

2. ALTHOUGH IT IS TOO EARLY TO HAZARD A GUESS AS TO THE OUTCOME WE CAN SEE THREE WAYS IN WHICH THIS SITUATION MAY WORK OUT:

A. IF SOVIETS PREFER TO KEEP SEA POT BOILING, KOSYGIN MAY USE LEGALISTIC ARGUMENTS TO PRESSURE GOI

CONFIDENTIAL

**TELEGRAM****CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 03 NEW DE 08848 01 OF 02 231539Z

PAGE 4 RUSBAE 8848/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
INTO TACTFUL INACTIVITY.

B. MRS. GANDHI, ON ADVICE OF TITO AND WITH SUPPORT OF THOSE KEY ELEMENTS OF GOI WHICH ARE NOT RPT NOT SUBJECT TO SOVIET PRESSURE (MORARJI DESAI, ETC.) MAY DECIDE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE PROGRAM CALLED FOR IN COMMUNIQUE.

C. INDIANS MAY ATTEMPT TO HEDGE BY PREPARING TO MOVE IN AFFIRMATIVE DIRECTION WHILE SLOWING DOWN COMMISSION EFFORTS TO OBTAIN RESOURCES NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT ITS PROPOSED NEW FUNCTIONS.

3. IN THIS FLUID SITUATION, I BELIEVE USG IS IN POSITION SIGNIFICANTLY TO AFFECT FINAL DECISION AND POSSIBLY TO ACHIEVE AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH. I SUGGEST FOLLOWING STEPS:

A. I AGREE THAT OUR REGRETS OF RECENT US VIOLATION OF CAMBODIAN BORDER HOWEVER POLITICALLY DISTASTEFUL WERE NECESSARY. WE CAN MAKE OUR POSITION EVEN MORE CREDIBLE BY TAKING THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT FOR AN UNBIASED ICC EFFORT WHICH WOULD TAKE US AS WELL AS OTHER SIDE TO TASK FOR FURTHER VIOLATIONS.

PAGE 5 RUSBAE 8848/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. IN ORDER TO PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON EVERYONE CONCERNED BUT PARTICULARLY ON GOI AND SIHANOUK, I URGE THAT US

PROVIDE RKG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF SPECIFIC CURRENT INFORMATION ABOUT PRECISE LOCATION OF VC/NVA ELEMENTS ON CAMBODIAN SIDE OF BORDER. SIHANOUK HAS STATED HE WOULD WELCOME THIS INFORMATION AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY GIVE IT TO ICC AND TO HIS OWN MILITARY FOR AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION. PRESUMABLY OUR REPORTS WILL BE SENT THROUGH AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.

BUT WE MUST BE SURE OF OUR FACTS. IF ICC AND RKG AFTER MAKING A GENUINE EFFORT TO INVESTIGATE OUR CHARGES FIND THEY ARE UNFOUNDED, OUR CREDIBILITY WILL LARGELY BE

**CONFIDENTIAL**



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NEW DE 08848 01 OF 02 231539Z

DESTROYED. IF, ON OTHER HAND, WE CAN PROVIDE RKG WITH PERSUASIVE LISTING OF AREAS WHERE WE ARE CONVINCED CAMBODIA IS BEING USED AS REFUGE, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO OPPOSE OR SEEK TO WATER DOWN DEVELOPMENT OF FULLY ADEQUATE ICC.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IS EFFORT BY MRS GANDHI TO FUDGE POSITION (PARA 2C), PARTICULARLY AFTER RUMORS WHICH WILL INEVITABLY BE PRODUCED BY HER TALKS WITH

PAGE 6 RUSZY 8846/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
KOSYGIN, WOULD EXPOSE HER TO SHARP FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC

CRITICISM. IN INDIA SHE WOULD BE CRITICIZED NOT ONLY BY OPPOSITION AND PRESS BUT ALSO BY LARGE SEGMENTS OF CONGRESS PARTY.

C. FURTHER TO BOX IN THE FOOT DRAGGING I SUGGEST CANADIANS REQUEST PROMPT STUDY BY COMMISSION OF LOGISTICAL AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS NOT ONLY FOR HELICOPTERS BUT FOR ICC BORDER PATROLS CALLED FOR BY COMMUNIQUE. CANADIANS MIGHT EVEN COME UP WITH TENTATIVE PROPOSALS TO UNDERScore IMPORTANCE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK AND TO DISCOURAGE A MERELY SYMBOLIC ICC EFFORT. BINDRA, PREVIOUSLY INDIAN CHAIRMAN CC CAMBODIA, TELLS US HE TOOK POSITION THAT HE COULD ACQUIRE ON BEHALF OF COMMISSION WHATEVER EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES WERE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT INVESTIGATIONS WHICH COMMISSION

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

22

85964

CONFIDENTIAL

471

#017

PAGE 01 NEW DE 08848 02 OF 02 231349Z

ACTION EA 15

SECTION 292

INFO EUR 15, NEA 13, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 12,

P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, IO 13, CIA 04, AID 28,

SAL 01, RSR 01, MM 01, /159 W

SDO 2

RF

OEL/SAZ

OEL/NEA/SAZ

OEL/ICD2

OEL/EEP

OEL/SFA

OEL/EEY

OEL/CAN 2

OEL/FR 2

ONE

HOLOPS

INDICO

BR 2

OER 2

OSR/PA

DDI/SRS

OSA

OSI/PS

OEGT 2

SAVAZ

N/FBIS

SOD 3

R/SPG

CA 3

NE 4

RE 2

EUR 3

SB

P 231058Z JAN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2758  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 408  
AMCONSUL BOMBAY 2545  
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1864  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 89  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 618  
AMCONSUL MADRAS 1589  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 418  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 110  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 200  
AMEMBASSY RANGOON 106  
AMEMBASSY SAIGON 489  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 86  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 49  
CINCPAC  
USUN NEW YORK 285

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 NEW DELHI 8848

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 8848/2 CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ: CAMBODIA

D. CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO POSSI-

CONFIDENTIAL

(48)



## Department of State

## TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NEW DE 08848 02 OF 2 231349Z

BILITY THAT THIS IS ONE ISSUE ON WHICH WE CAN COOPERATE WITH FRANCE. WHATEVER MAY BE OUR DIVERGENCIES WITH FRANCE OVER THE RESPECTIVE POLICIES IN SEA, FRENCH ARE ON GOOD TERMS WITH CAMBODIA, HAVE MILITARY MISSION THERE, AND PRESUMABLY HAVE INTEREST IN SEEING FIGHTING KEPT AWAY FROM CAMBODIAN TERRITORY. FRENCH AMBASSADORS BOTH HERE AND IN CAMBODIA HAVE BEEN FRIENDLY AND ENCOURAGING ON SUBJECT MY MISSION. CONSEQUENTLY WE MIGHT EXPLORE WITH FRENCH GOVT ITS WILLINGNESS, IF ASKED TO DO SO BY RKG, TO SUPPLY HELICOPTERS AND OTHER MATERIEL WHICH CAMBODIA COULD THEN TURN OVER TO ICC. / Ha!

E. IN OUR DEALINGS WITH INDIANS, I RECOMMEND THAT UNTIL SITUATION IS CLARIFIED WE ASSUME THAT WHAT DAYAL AND KAUL TOLD ME IS IN FACT WHAT GOI INTENDS TO DO. GOI OFFICIALS AND MRS. GANDHI ARE MORE LIKELY TO COME UP

PAGE 3 RUSBAE 8848/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
WITH A FORTHRIGHT POSITION IF WE APPEAR TO TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT GOI WILL CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.

F. FINALLY I RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED

TO  
SEE NONG KIMNY, CAMBODIAN AMB IN DELHI, AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS QUESTION OF RETURN TO NORMAL RELATIONS.  
AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, ALL CAMBODIANS WITH WHOM WE  
DISCUSSED MATTER IN PHNOM PENH, INCLUDING SIHANOUK,  
EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATION-  
SHIPS. ALTHOUGH I REALIZE THIS CREATES CERTAIN PROBLEMS  
IN BOTH BANGKOK AND SAIGON I SHOULD THINK IN VIEW OF  
THEIR ULTIMATE DEPENDENCE ON US FOR THEIR INTERNAL  
SECURITY, THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE, PARTICULARLY  
IN VIEW OF RECENT AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSES OF BRITISH, JAPANESE,  
ITALIANS, GERMANS, FILIPINOS. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONCOCT LANGUAGE  
WHICH WOULD BE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE  
TO CAMBODIANS AND YET LEGALLY OBSCURE ENOUGH NOT TO  
ALARM OUR FRIENDS. FOR INSTANCE, WHEN WE QUOTE  
RECOGNIZE CAMBODIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WITHIN HER  
PRESENT BOUNDARIES UNQUOTE WE ARE NOT RPT NOT TAKING  
A PRECISE POSITION AS TO WHERE THOSE BOUNDARIES ACTUALLY ARE. / ✓

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